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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DALE L. LARSON, GRETHE
LARSON, and SYSTEMATIC
BUILDERS, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiffs-Petitioners,
V.

Court of Appeals No. 900411-CA
Lower Court No. 870903405

OVERLAND THRIFT AND LOAN,
a Utah corporation, LINDA
D. MILNE, and WESTERN
SURETY COMPANY,

(Category 16.)

fc-3Tti

Defendants-Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petition for writ of certiorari to review
a decision of the Utah Court of Appeals
Michael L. Dowdle - #4025
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS
215 South State Street
Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone 801 531 8400
Attorney for respondent
Overland Thrift & Loan
Joseph T. Dunbeck - #3645
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN
310 South Main Street
Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone 801 363 3300
Attorney for respondents
Linda D. Milne and Western
Surety Company

Michael F. Olmstead - #2455
David Eccles Building
Suite 714
385-24th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone 801 393 5376
Attorney for Petitioners

FILED
DFX 1 6 1991
ClERKbUPRBAECOUR'i
UTAH

yy[ichael

C

J. Olmstead

ATTORNEY-AT-LAW
David Eccles Building, Suite 714
385-24th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone (801) 393-5376

January 21, 1992

Supreme Court of Utah
Office of the Clerk
332 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Re:

E.R.R.A.T.A. /Petition For Writ of Certiorari
Larson, et.ux. v. Overland Thrift and Loan, et.al.
Case No. 91-0550
Court of Appeals Case No. 900411-CA

Dear Clerk:
In connection with the above, there is an incorrect reference
to "Overland" in the tenth line on page 10 of the Petition. The word
"Colonial" should be substituted for the word "Overland".
Through oversight, page two (back) of the equipment lease
mentioned in the Petition and referred to as being attached to the
Petition as Appendix IX were omitted. I herein enclose 10 copies to
be inserted just inside the back cover.
Thank you for your consideration.
Very truly yours,

Michael F. Olmstead
Attorney at Law
MF0:ssp
Encl.
cc:

Attorney Michael L. Dowdle

cc:

Joseph C. Dunbeck
Attorney at Law
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291 West 5400 South
Suite 0200
Murray, Utah $4107
801/263-2626

VS

F C, "Lsnor", hreoy la—a so " L S I H I " , the property describedherein below according to the terms eat forth
1. DESCRIPTION OF LEASED PROPERTY:
lUANTITY

EQUIPMENT (MANUFACTURER, MODEL. NO , T Y « , ETC.)

Sodick Model CNC1W Electrical Discharge Machine
•Including as additional security The Real Estate owned by Dale L. and
Grethe Larson as evidenced by a deed of trust dated the A?**- day of
November 1984, with this lease referred to therein as the underlying
indebtedness pursuant to Utah code amotated 357-1-31 (as amended).

1)

initial

MPMENT WILL BE LOCATED AT

to

STREET ADDRESS.

Kearns

Y
NJ^NDED USE

INITIAL

£_AL

4845 South 3600 West

.STATE-

"53115"

Utah

.COUNTY.

ZIP.
Personal, Family or Household

Business,

Salt Lake

1 have read and agree unconditionally with paragraph 24 on the reverse side hereof which states that any controversy or
claim arising out of this contract shall be settled by ARBITRATION in Salt Lake City, Utah, and judgment upon the
award rendered may be entered in the courts of the State of Utah, and I hereby agree to submit to arbitration a> the
jurisdiction for purposes of enforcement of this agreement* a n d a g r e e t o p e r m i t t h e p r o v i s i o n S / O f T i t

PAYMENT AND LEASE TERM 57 of Utah Code Amotated relating to trust deed forclosures to ^remain,
in f u l l force & e f f e f t separate and apart from this provision,y<
/J/
60

ion of Lease

.. 2 7 t h

Security Deposit Refundable at maturity

. — » « _ _ « . mon ths

. day of each 83 month
i d P F C m Salt Lake City

D quarter

OOther

12-2 7

tNVBSTMiNT

$

Payment amount each period

*

Use Tax

nts beginning — 1 1 - 2 7
•eyment due

|

_

J^L.

Total Payment including Use Tax

JLA.

Total FRONT PAYMENT including Security

lf994»30

$«

114.61

2,108.97
4,217.94

TAX' CfiEOtT. tf ANY , SHALL BC CLAMCD BY LZ330H

ASSIGNMENT OF WARRANTIES AND LIMIT ON LESSOR'S LIABILITY Neither Lessor nor any assignee of Ussor shall be liable for any failure to
i any provision hereof resulting from fire or other casualty, not, strike oi other labor difficulty, governmental regulation or restriction or any cause be
essor's control In no event shall Lessor be liable for any loss of profits or other consequential damage or any inconvenience resulting from any theft,
to, loss of, defect in or failure of the equipment, or the time consumed in recovering, repairing, adjusting, tervicmg or replacing the same, and there shall
aatement or apportionment of rental during such time LESSOR MAKES NO WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, CONCERNING THE EQUIPHOWEVER, THIS DOES NOT ABROGATE ANY WARRANTY PROVIDED BY THE MANUFACTURER, WHICH WARRANTIES ARE HEREBY
IED TO LESSEE TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY CONTRACT AND LAW
MSURANCE: Lessee, at its sole cost and expense, shall maintain in full force on all such equipment during the term of this Agreement
i) A policy of public liability and property damage insurance protecting the interest of Lessor and Lessee with respect to their liability for injuries to third
ind damage to and loss of use of property of third persons resulting from the operation of the equipment leased hereunder Such public liability and
damage insurance shall have limits of not less than $100,000 per person and $300,000 for all persons injured or killed in the same accident and shall
> a limit of not less than $50,000 for damage, destruction and loss of use of property of third persons as a result of any one accident unless otherwise here

) A policy of hazard insurance including fire, theft or damage from all other insurable sources on said equipment the deductible amount to be not in
$250 Lessee shall stand the expense of said deductible amount The hazard insurance on such equipment shall be for the actual cash value of the equipj in such amounts as the Lessor shall deem adequate
RTIES HAVE REAO THE ABOVE PROVISIONS AND ALSO PARAGRAPHS 4 THROUGH 24 ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF AND AGREE
)UND BY ALL SUCH PROVISIONS
WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this instrument on the date below listed

Kent Knowle

^

972-5774

PPLIER O F E Q U I P M E N T (COMPLETE ADDRESS)

RMDUmAIN MACHINE TOOL
Pioneer Road
Lake City, Utah 84104
(INCLUDE ZIP CODE)

. rContact
r

Bob Lucking

.Ph.

969-7864

F U L L L E G A L N A M E A N D A D D R E S S O F LESSEE

"I

Robert J. Lucking & Dale L. Larson dba L & L Wire
PO Box 168
EDM
Vfest Jordon, Utah 84084
(INCLUDE ZIP CODE)
LESSEE(S)

(Ston Below)

OATE
DATE EXECUTED BY
BY LESSEE November
Novembe

27,

.19

84

Lessee shall furnish to Lessor a copy of such ir
ince policies prior to taking delivery of Equipment Lessor s h i . an additional named insured on all required policies At
any time Lessor does not have evidence of such current insurance lessor may treat such failure as a default under this contract In the event of the cancellation of any of the
insurance policies required herein Lessee shall give Lessor immediate notice of such cancellation and the use by Lessee of Equipment shall cease and any right or permission
express or implied given to Lessee hereunder to use and operate said equipment shall cease until all such insurance has been renewed or replaced in the event such insurance is
not renewed or replaced Equipment shall be returned to Lessor and Lessor shall have the right to repossess the same without liability tor trespass or responsibility with respect to
it or to any article left in or attached to it and Lessee specifically agrees (a) that his signature upon this document constitutes his knowing waiver of his rig it to require Lessor to
give him notice and a hearing prior to repossession and (b) that should Lessor elect to purchase the required insurance on behalf of Lessee Lessee will upon demand reimburse
Lessor for the cost of such insurance Lessee agrees to indemnify and to save Lessor harmless from and against any and all loss damages claims liabilities and expense in any
manner arising out of the claims injury or damages to persons or property as a result of Lessee s operation of Equipment
All insurance shall be in force not only during the term of this Lease but in addition thereto from the time of delivery of Equipment to Lessee and until Equipment is returned to
Lessor shall provide for a 10-day prior written notice to Lessor of cancellation or reduction in coverage and shall protect the interest of both Lessor and Lessee in Equipment or
as the case may be shall protect both Lessor and Lessee with respect to risk arising out of the condition maintenance use or operation of Equipment The proceeds of any
insurance received by Lessor on account of or for any loss or casualty which has been made good by Lessee shall be released to Lessee upon satisfactory proof that said loss or
casualty has been made good unless the Lessee is at the time in default of the payment of any other liability hereunder
5 SUPPLIER NOT AN AGENT Lessee understands and agrees that neither supplier nor any salesman or other agent of supplier is an agent of Lessor No salesman or agent of
supplier is authorized to waive or alter any term or condition of this Lease and no representation as to Equipment or any other matter by supplier shall in any way affect Lessee s
duty to pay the rent and perform its other obligations as set forth in this Lease
6 ORDERING EQUIPMENT Lessor agrees to order Equipment from Supplier upon the terms and conditions of the purchase order initially attached hereto Lessee agrees to arrange
for delivery of Equipment so that it can be accepted within ninety days after the date of this Lease Any or all exceptions to FULL and COMPLETE delivery of the entire schedule of
Equipment as above shown is below stated by Lessee in space provided if space is left "blank by Lessor it is fully understood and agreed that Lessee hereby accepts full and
complete responsibility for Equipment scheduled and hereby stipulates that Delivery and Acceptance is without exception complete

7 GUARANTY SECURITY AND SECURITY DEPOSIT The guaranty security and security deposit if any gurrantees the full performance of the Lease and shall be returned to Lessee
upon the normal expiration of this Lease The primary purpose of the guaranty and security deposit is to protect Lessor in the event of a default guarantee the return of the
equipment in good condition reasonable wear and tear excepted and provide security for the payment of costs of repairs repossession and/or default expenses and penalties If
any security deposit remains after the payment of the costs of return of Equipment the repair of the same and other default expenses and penalties then Lessor may apply any
Excess to unpaid lease payments and DAMAGES
8 REPAIRS USE ALTERATIONS Lessee at its expense shall keep Equipment in good working condition and repair and furnish all labor parts mechanisms ano devices required
herefor Lessee shall use Equipment in a careful and lawful manner Lessee shall not make any alterations additions or improvements to Equipment without Lessor s prior
written consent All conditions and improvements made to Equipment shall belong to Lessor and shall not be removed without Lessor s prior written consent
9 OWNERSHIP PERSONAL PROPERTY Equipment is and shall at all times remain the property of Lessor and Lessee shall have no right title or interest therein or thereto except
is expressly set forth in this Lease Equipment is and shall at all times be and remain personal property notwithstanding that Equipment or any part thereof may now be or
tereafter become in any manner affixed or attached to real property or any building thereon
10 TERMINATION OF LEASE ANO RETURN OF PROPERTY Subject to Option to Purchase (see paragraph 11) at the expiration of this Lease or upon demand by Lessor made pursuant
o the default provisions hereof Lessee at its expense shall return Equipment in good working condition and repair by delivering it packed and ready for shipment to such place
r on board such carrier as Lessor may specify If purchase by Lessee or return of Equipment is not effected within 30days of maturity of this Lease Lessee agrees to continue
ormat monthly rent payments to Lessor until Equipment is either purchased or returned to Lessor
11 OPTION TO PURCHASE Lessee shall have an option to purchase Equipment at the end of the lease period for FAIR MARKET VALUE at that time plus all obligations remaining
ue under this Lease Notice of exercise of this option must be given in writing to Lessor or Lessor s assignee at least thirty (30) days prior to the expiration of the Lease This
ption shall terminate and be avoid upon termination of this lease by reason of Lessee s default
12 RIGHT TO PROTECT EQUIPMENT If Lessee tails to maintain insurance pay taxes assessments costs and any expense which Lessee is hereunder required to pay Lessor may
take expenditures for such purposes and the amounts so expended shall become immediately due and payable by Lessee to Lessor Lessor shall have the right to inspect
quipment at any reasonable time or place
13 OEFAULT BY LESSEE In the event Lessee files or there is caused to be filed a petition in bankruptcy or shall make or have made an assignment for the benefit of creditors or if
receiver shall be appointed for Lessee or if Lessee shall have permitted or suffered any attachment levy execution to be made levied or entered against or in any respect on
ly or all of Lessee s property or fails to perform any other obligation of this Lease (except payment of rent or maintenance of insurance which are dealt with herein) then upon
ve (5) days written notice by Lessor to Lessee to correct the default the right of Lessee under this Lease shall thereupon expire
in any event that Lessee fails to make any payment due and owing hereunder tor a period of fifteen (15) days after such payment is due then the rights of Lessee under this
greement shall thereupon expire Any extension of time or other alteration in contract terms allowed by Lessor shall not deprive it of any of its rights hereunder
14 OAMAGES In the event that Lessee fails to perform in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Lease and the rights of Lessee Hereunder exoire the t e<«M a n w « tn
iv to Lessor anv and all amr nfs rf "ip* i r i " » h ' , p s / . - ^ ' s computed to the dote 01 re.urn or sutn pruperty together with any loss or damage which Lessor may suffer as a
suit of the breach of this Lease by Lessee it being mutually agreed between Lessor and the Lessee that the minimum amount of such loss as a result of any such breach as
luidated damages due and payable on the date of expiration of this Lease shall be a sum equal to one-third of the monthly payments that would have been paid if the Lease had
mtmued in full force and effect for the period set forth in Paragraph 2 above without consideration of the shortening of the term by reason of default
The failure of Lessor at any time to exercise its rights under this paragraph in the event of any such default by Lessee shall not affect its right and power to exercise such rights
the event of any subsequent default For the purpose of repossessing Equipment Lessor may enter upon any premises of Lessee where Equipment may be and remove the same
id Lessee hereby waives any claim for trespass or damage occasioned thereby
Lessee shall bear the entire risk of loss theft destruction or damage of Equipment or any item thereof (herein "Loss or Damage") from any cause whatsoever No loss or
mage or malfunction of Equipment shall relieve Lessee of the obligation to pay rent or any other obligation under this lease In the event of loss or damage Lessee at the option
Lessor shall (a) place the same in good condition and repair or (b) replace the same with like equipment in good condition and repair with clear title therein to Lessor or (c) pay
Lessor the total of the following amounts (1) the total rent due and owing at the time of such payment plus (11) the present value (at the Salt Lake City current bank rate of
erest) of all rent and other amounts payable by Lessee with respect to said item from date of such payment to date of expiration of the then current term of this Lease plus (111)
• residual value which said item would have had at the end of the term Upon Lessor s receipt of such payment Lessee and/or Lessee s insurer shall be entitled to Lessor s
erest in said item for salvage purposes in its then condition and location as is without warranty express or implied
15 LESSOR S EXPENSES Lessee shall pay Lessor all costs and expenses including late payment assessments reasonable attorney s fees the fees of collection agencies and all
ler expenses of collection such as telephone and telegraph charges incurred by lessor in enforcing any of the terms conditions or provisions hereof
16 NOTICES Any notice required to be given hereunder shall be deemed completed five (5) days after posting with postage prepaid in regular or certified U S mail to each of the
ties at their respective addresses indicated in the initial paragraph of this Lease
17 AMENDMENTS Any amendment to this Lease must be made in writing signed and dated by the parties and attached to this Lease
8 RIGHTS TO ASSIGN LEASE
(a) Lessee agrees that Lessor may assign all or any part of the monies and claims for monies due and to become due to Lessor and all other rights of Lessor under this Lease
)n receipt of written notice of assignment Lessee shall pay to assignee all monies as they become due under this Lease Lessee s obligation to pay said monies to the assignee
ill be unconditional and shall not be subject to any defense or offset unless or until assignee notifies Lessee in writing that this Lease has been reassigned back to Lessor
b) Lessee agrees that it will not assign transfer sublet or lease its rights under this Lease and will not pledge mortgage or otherwise encumber or subject to or permit to exist
m or be subjected to any lien or charge any right or interest of Lessee hereunder without Lessor s prior written consent
9 LOCATION LESSOR S INSPECTION LABELS Equipment shall be delivered and thereafter kept at the location specified above or tf none is specified at Lessee s address set
h above and shall not be removed therefrom without Lessor s prior written consent Lessor shall have the right to inspect Equipment at any re asonable time If Lessor
plies Lessee with labels stating that Equipment is owned by Lessor Lessee shall affix and keep same in a prominent place on each item of Equipment
0 TERMINATION DURING TERM THIS LEASE MAY NOT BE TERMINATED PRIOR TO ITS EXPIRATION BY EITHER PARTY EXCEPT THAT LESSOR MAY TERMINATE THE AGREEMENT
)N DEFAULT BY LESSEE AS STATED HEREIN
1 LATE CHARGE If Lessee fails to pay when due rent or other amount required herein to be paid by Lessee Lessee shall pay to Lessor a late charge of five percent (5%) of each
aliment or part thereof for which said r#nt or other amou*' shal» be de1 ->q j r - t 0 C5 0C w^ichevc 1$ g eaie. pius interest on such delinquent rent or other amount from the due
e thereof until nairf a» the rat* of 18% p*r annum both befce and after 3ny judgment that may be rendered in favo- of Lessor against Lessee on sa*d sums
2 LIENS TAXES Lessee shall keep Equipment free and clear of all levies liens and encumbrances Lessee shall in the manner directed by Lessor (a) make and file all
larations and returns in connection with all charges and taxes (local state and federal) which may now or hereafter be imposed upon or measured by the ownership leasing
al sale purchase possession or use of Equipment excluding however all taxes on or measured by Lessor s net income and (b) pay all such charges and taxes
Lessee fails to discharge said levies liens and encumbrances or to pay said charges and taxes Lessor shall have the right but shall not be obligated to effect such
harge or pay such charges and taxes In that event Lessee shall repay to Lessor the cost thereof with the next payment of rent
) TAX BENEFITS IF INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT is passed from Lessor to Lessee it must be by written consent of Lessor and in that event if Lessor is caused by Lessee s default
ther action of Lessee at variance with this assignment or by government action to sacrifice Investment Tax Credits depreciation or the loss of any other tax benefits to
:h Lessor is originally entitled Lessee agrees to indemnify Lessor against those losses This will be the difference between Lessor s tax liability before loss of tax benefits and
liability determined to exist after Lessor s loss of tax benefits
ARBITRATION ANY CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS CONTRACT OR THE BREACH THEREOF SHALL BE SETTLED BY ARBITRATION IN
ORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION AND JUDGMENT UPON THE AWARD RENDERED BY THE ARBITRATOR(S) MAY BE ENTERED IN ANY
RT HAVING JURISDICTION THEREOF ARBITRATION SHALL BE HELD IN THE CITY OF SALT LAKE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE STATE OF UTAH AND ANY QUESTION OF LAW SHALL
DECIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ENTIRE AGREEMENT This Lease is intended by the parties as the final expression of their agreement and as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms thereof The
es shall not be bound by any agent s or employee s representation promise or inducement not set forth in this agreement No representations understandings or
ements have been made or relied upon in the making of this agreement other than those specifically set forth herein
LESSEE DOCUMENTATION Lessee shall provide Lessor with such corporate resolutions opinions of counsel financial statements and other documents as Lessor shall
est from time to time If more than one Lessee is ium»rf m th.« u « « <*. 1 . * •. ~* —— -
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DALE L. LARSON, GRETHE
LARSON, and SYSTEMATIC
BUILDERS, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Court of Appeals No. 900411-CA
Plaintiffs and Petitioners,
Lower Court No. 870903405
vs
Category 16.
OVERLAND THRIFT & LOAN,
a Utah corporation; LINDA
D. MILNE, and WESTERN
SURETY COMPANY,
Defendants and Respondents. |
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioners herewith petition the Supreme Court of
Utah for writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
to review the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals filed
in the above matter on October 17, 1991.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
.1.

Was the Court correct in concluding as a matter of

law That Overland was entitled to judgment against
Dale;
That the equipment lease was not a security
agreement; and
That Dale could not recover against notary
public Milne based on the factual allegations of the
complaint taken as true and considering them and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff.

2.

Was petitioners1 appeal from the summary judgment in

favor of Milne and Western Surety frivolous.
The decision of which review is requested is published
and is re-printed and included in the Appendix.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The date of the decision sought to be reviewed is
October 17, 1991; the date of the order respecting rehearing
is November 15, 1991; and the statutory provision conferring
jurisdiction on the Utah Supreme Court to review the decision
by a writ of certiorari is Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5)

(1989).

CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES
Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: Appendix V
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:

Appendix VI

Utah Code Ann. § 5 7-1-32:

Appendix VII

Fifth Amendment, U.S. Constitution:

Appendix VIII

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case, course of the proceedings, and disposition
in the lower courts:
In the beginning petitioners (Dale and Grethe Larson)
owned their residence as joint tenants. A trust deed describing the residence was given to respondent Overland as additional
security on an equipment lease "in the amount of $122,185.92."
(r. 100-03; Opinion 2)
(r. 404; Opinion 2)

Dale executed a guaranty of the lease,

The lease (r. 409-410; App. IX) provided

for liquidated damages in the event of lessee1s default as well
as for lessor's reasonable attorney's fees and expenses incurred

"in enforcing any of the terms, conditions or provisions"
of the lease.
Dale did not sign the trust deed; Grethe signed his
name as well as her own.

Respondent Milne, as notary,

notarized the trust deed as though it had been executed
by Dale.

Milne was not present when the trust deed was

signed.

(r. 12-14; Opinion 2) Milne recorded the trust

deed.
Default occurred under the lease and the equipment
was returned to Overland at which time there was $33,198.98
due in payments under the lease computed according to the
lease's liquidated damages provision.

Overland foreclosed

the trust deed non-judicially and purchased the residence
at trustee's sale for $51,864.90.

In subsequent summary

judgment proceedings initiated by Overland, it was adjudged
that Overland purchased and received only Grethe's interest
in the residence at trustee's sale for the $51,864.90.
Larsons instituted this lawsuit to quiet title against
the trust deed, for rescission of the trust deed and damages
for fraud in the inducement and negligent misrepresentation,
for judgment declaring the lease a security agreement, and
for damages against Milne and her surety, Western Surety,
for the false notarization of the trust deed.

(r. 391-413)

By amended counterclaim, Overland sued Dale on the
equipment lease guaranty, and sued Grethe to have it
declared that only her interest in the residence was affected

3

by the foreclosure and trustee1s sale proceedings.
608)

(r. 591-

Milne and Western Surety counterclaim against Grethe for

indemnity "against the claim of Mr. Larson and any other third
party who may so assert."

(r. 419-426)

On March 1, 1990 Milne and Western Surety were granted
judgment that the Larsons1 "complaint/ as finally amended/ and
claim against Defendants Linda. D. Milne and Western Surety
Company are dismissed with prejudice upon the merits." (r. 845847; App. II)
On March 27, 1990 Overland1s motion for summary judgment
was granted.

The judgment dismissed Systematic/ adjudged in

favor of Overland on Larsons1 fraud claim/ declared that the
equipment lease was. not a security agreement/ adjudged that
Dale was liable for the lease payments because of the guaranty
agreement he signed and because he was a partner of the lessee/
and adjudged and confirmed that only Grethe1s interest in the
residence was affected by the trust deed and subsequent foreclosure proceedings.

(r. 936-940; App. Ill)

On May 14/ 1990/ judgment was entered in favor of
Overland and against Dale for $69/883.80 (total lease paymentsf
less lease payments made and net proceeds from sale of the
equipment)/ and for $31/740 expenses which included attorneyfs
fees of $29/693.50 and collection and court costs of $2/046.65
(r. 964)/ and declared Overland's sale of the equipment to have
been in good faith.

(r. 1018-1021; App. IV)

Larsons appealed the three judgments.
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The Court of

Appeals affirmed the lower court's determination that the
lease was not a security agreementf and the money judgment
against Dale, but reversed on the fraud claim against
Overland.

The summary judgment in favor of Milne and

Western Surety was also affirmed and the Court of Appeals
held that Larsons1 appeal therefrom is frivolous and awarded single costs and attorney fees under appellate rule 33.
Statement of facts:
On November 27, 1984, the equipment lease in question
was executed with PFC, Inc., as lessor, (r. 675; Opinion 2,
App. IX)

Overland is assignee of the lease for a net advance

to PFC of $77,767.45. (r. 108; Opinion 2)
On November 20, 1984, Grethe signed the trust deed in
question and also signed Dale's name because Dale was not
present at the time and because Overlandfs agent, Ray Welling,
asked her to. (r. 12-14, 118; 100-103; Opinion 2)

Overland

stated that the trust deed was for "partial collateral
security for payment of the lease." (r. 638, J[ B.)
Milne, as notary, falsely notarized the trust deed
to reflect that Dale had executed the trust deed when in
fact he had not.

(r. 12-14) Milne recorded the trust deed.

An undated equipment lease guaranty agreement was
signed by Dale. (r. 404; Opinion 2)
Notice of default was recorded January 23, 1987, for
delinquent lease payments for August through December, 1986.
At trustee's sale on May 27, 1987, Overland purchased the
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trustee's interest in the residence for $51,864.90 (r. 599600
dated

Ji[ 41,42; Opinion 2)

Overland's Trustee's Deed is

and recorded May 27, 1987 (r. 411-413)
At the time of the trustee's sale there was

$33,198.98 due under the lease computed in accordance with
the liquidated damages provision of the lease (5 14f App. IX).
The trust deed recited that
"This Deed is being recorded for additional
securing [sic]
on a lease for Robert J.
Lucking & Dale L. Larson dba L&L Wire edm
in the amount of $112,185.92 on lease
number 312 401 Dated November 7, 1984."
(r. 100)
The attorney fee and expense judgment against Dale
was granted solely on the following affidavit statement,
Inasmuch as litigation in this matter has
lasted approximately three (3) years,
Overland has incurred substantial legal
fees and costs. As of April 5, 1990,
Overland has incurred attorneys' fees in
the amount of $29,693.65 and collection
costs and court costs in the amount of
$2,046.65. (r. 964)
ARGUMENT
1.

The Overland judgment against Dale on the equip-

ment lease guaranty agreement is incorrect.
Overland sued Dale on the equipment lease in December,
1989, (r. 591-608) at a time when the obligation under the
lease had been fully paid and satisfied at trustee's sale on
May 27, 1987.

(If the equipment lease was paid or otherwise

satisfied, Dale's obligation was terminated.
Guaranty, § 78)
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38 Am.Jur.2d,

Overland having elected to proceed to collect on
the lease by non-judicial foreclosure of the trust deed
is bound to pursue any deficiency in accordance with the
provisions of Section 57-1-32 (App. VII) which is the
exclusive procedure for securing a deficiency judgment
following a trustee's sale of real property under a trust
deed.

Cox v. Green, 696 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1985)

In that the

statutory procedure was not followed by Overland/ it must
be assumed/ and the evidence showsf that the damages obligations under the lease and secured by the trust deed were
fully paid and satisfied by the trustee's sale of the property to Overland for $51/864.90 when the amount due on the
obligation was only $33/198.98.
Under the facts of this casef the judgment against
Dale gives double recovery to Overland for a single claim
which is prohibited.

18 Wright & Millerf Federal Practice

and Procedure/ § 4476 (1981)
The liquidated damages provision in the equipment
lease is enforceable.

Young Elec. Sign Co. v. United

Standard West/ Inc./ 755 P.2d 162 (Utah 1988)
Additionally/ the judgment for attorney's fees and
expenses against dale was improper because there was no
evidence presented to show that the fees were reasonable or
necessary, or the nature of the work done.

Such evidence is

necessary because of the attorney's fee clause (fl5/ App. XI).
Rinqwood v. Foreign Auto Worksr Inc.y 786 P.2d 1350 (Utah App.
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1990).

"Attorney fees awarded pursuant to contract or statute

are usually those found by the court to be freasonable/' unless
the statute or contract provides otherwise."
Store v. Bracy, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989).

Canyon Country

" . . . an evidentiary

basis is a fundamental requirment for establishing an award of
attorney fees."

Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1233 (Utah Ct.

App. 1988)
The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
judgment against Dale conflicts with the' decision of the Supreme
Court in Cox v. Green, supra, with the result that it allows
recovery twice on the same claim and violates Dalefs liberty and
property rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
2.

The conclusion of law that the equipment lease in

question is a true lease is incorrect.
Many of the factors mentioned in Colonial Leasing Co.
v. Larson Bros. Const., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) that bear on
determining whether the terms of an agrement show that it was
meant to be a lease or- a security agreement are present here.
In contract law, the intention of the parties controls appellate
court decisions regarding the substance of agreements, and that
intention is expressed by the clear language of the contract.
Falkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1983); Valley Bank &
Trust Co. v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 933 (Utah App.
1989).
In Colonial, the Utah Supreme Court Jield that parol
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evidence is admissible where the character of the written
agreement is itself ambiguous even though its specific
terms are not.

Here, as in Colonial, the trial judge did

not address what the provisions indicated as to the intent
of the parties or whether the terms were ambiguous, therefore necessitating the admission of parol evidence to
ascertain the intention *.>f the parties.

The inquiry as

to what the parties intended remains unresolved so the
Court of Appeals could not declare the lease here was not
a security agreement and neither could the trial court.
In Colonial, 731 P.2d, at 488, the Utah Supreme Court said
that under such circumstances the issue as to the intent
of the parties as to the terms of the contract

"is to be

determined by the jury."
In its Opinion, at page 2, the Court of Appeals
incorrectly interprets a provision of Utah Code Ann. § 70A1-201(37) (1990) as "negating the impact of Colonial Leasing"
as to certain of the factors specified.

The statute states

that a "transaction does not create a security interest
merely because" certain of those factors are presented.
Giving the term "merely," the term used in the section, its
ordinary and dictionary meaning (Websters, "exclusive of or
considered apart from anything else."), the referenced
factors are not alone sufficient to establish a lease as a
security aqreement, but continue to be "facts" when weighed
with other factors in the determination, in which circum-
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the factors mentioned are not "negated."
Overland itself refers to the transaction as one involving a security agreement ("underlying indebtedness,"
"collateral," "additonal security") in unambiguous language,
Westmont Tractor Co. v, Continental I, Inc., 731 P.2d 327
(Mont. 1986), but the Court does not address what Overland's
intentions are in using the language expressed.
The determination as a matter of law that the lease
was not a security agreement conflicts with the decision of the
Utah Supreme Court in Overland.
3.

The Court of Appeals was incorrect in affirming

the summary judgment for Milne and Western which dismissed
Larsons1 complaint, and claims therein, against them, and was
further incorrect in concluding as a matter of law that Larsons1
appeal from such summary judgment was frivolous.
The judgment dismissing Larsons1 complaint was correct
only if, as a matter of law, Larsons could not recover under
the facts alleged in the complaint.

In considering the factual

allegations of the complaint, the court must "take them as true
and consider them and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff."
Cent. Irr. Co., 793 P.2d 897 (Uah 1990)

Golding v. Ashley

The facts stated in

this petition are stated in accordance with the foregoing.
The factual allegations are that Milne, as notary,
notarized the trust deed as though Dale had signed it in her
presence and acknowledged to her that he did sign it, which is
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false.

Milne

ment allowed.

recorded the trust deed which her acknowledgThe recorded trust deed slandered and created a

cloud on Dale's title.

The allegations of the complaint

further establish that Dale was required to hire lawyers to
litigate and remove the cloud from his title and he sustained
damage for the attorney's fees he had to pay.

It may be

inferred from the record that when Overland was satisfied
that Dale had not in fact signed the trust deed, or that
Dale's wife Grethe had signed it for him, Dale's interest
in the property purportedly acquired by Overland at trustee's
sale was relinquished by Overland whereby it sought, and
was granted, appropriate judicial declaration of such relinquishment.
Milne and Western are not helped by the fact that it
was Grethe, Dale's wife, who signed his name to the trust
deed.

There is no husband-wife exception to the requirement

of the Statute of Frauds [Section 15-5-1] that no interest
in real property shall be granted otherwise than by deed or
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party granting the
same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing,
(Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986) and only
a written power of attorney will authorize one to bind
another to a trust deed.
(Utah 1983).
writing.

Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149

Any claimed ratification must also be in

Bradshaw v. McBride, 749 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982)

Grethe signing Dale's name to the trust deed did nothing to
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affect his title to the property.

Handy v. Shiells, 235 Cal.

Rptr. 543 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1987).
Again, it is necessary only that as a matter of law
Larsons, or either or both of them, can recover under the
facts alleged.

This Dale can do and on the same basis the

court held against the notary in Decamp y» Allen, 156 So.2d
661 (Fla. 1963), viz., the false notarization and acknowledgment entitled the trust deed describing Dale's interest in the
real property to be recorded and thereby to slander and cloud
the title which required, as the final complaint alleges, Dale
to engage the services of lawyers to pursue and protect his
interest in the real property for which he may recover reasonable expenses

of litigation, including attorney1s fees.

South

Sanpitch Co. v. Pack, 765 P.2d 1279 (Utah App. 1988).
The judgment dismissing the claim was therefore incorrect and Larsons' appeal therefrom warranted under the
circumstances.

It follows then that appellate rule 33 was

applied improperly in this case.
By its decision the panel of the Court of Appeals has
so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, and has sanctioned the trial court in so doing,
that such decision should not be permitted to stand.
DATED December 16, 1991.

{.
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Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Jackson.
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
A deed of trust was recorded on the Larsons' home in favor
of Overland Thrift and Loan (Overland) as additional security for
the lease financing of industrial equipment. The lease went into
default and Overland repossessed the equipment and initiated
foreclosure on the home. The Larsons sued to rescind the trust
deed and to enjoin the foreclosure sale. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the
Larsons appeal following final certification of judgment under
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b). We affirm in part and
reverse in part.

I.

FACTS

On November 27, 1984, a lease financing agreement was
entered into between PFC, a lease broker, as lessor; and, Dale L.
Larson and Robert J. Lucking, partners in L & L Wire EDM, as ~
lessees, for the five-year lease of industrial equipment. The
agreement specifically referred to a home owned by Dale Larson
and Grethe Larson as additional security pledged for the leased
equipment that had been supplied by Intermountain Machine Tool
(Intermountain). In connection with the lease financing
~£
agreement, Dale Larson and Robert Lucking also signed an ^^
equipment lease guaranty as co-guarantors.
On November 20, 1984, PFC employee Ray Welling delivered to
the Larsons a trust deed prepared for their signatures. The
trust deed named the Larsons as grantors of the trust deed on
their home owned in joint tenancy, and Overland as beneficiary.
The trust deed expressly stated it was "being recorded for
additional securing [sic] on a lease for Robert J. Lucking & Dale
L. Larson dba L & L Wire edm in the amount of $112,185.92 on
yS
lease number 312 401 Dated November 7, 1984." After the trust r ?
deed was executed, Linda Milne notarized and recorded it.
The day after the lease financing agreement was signed, PFC
formally assigned its interest in the lease to Overland. Monthly
lea^e payments were made until September 2, 1986, when the lease
went into default. A flurry of activity then followed. The
Larsons gave Systematic Builders a warranty deed on their home on
January 21, 1987. Two days later, Overland recorded a Notice of
Breach and Election to sell the Larson home and a trustee's sale
was set for May 27, 1987. Systematic Builders subsequently
recorded its warranty deed on February 5, 1987. Overland
gz> \JO
repossessed the equipment on February 15, 1987, and sold it for
$10,750 over a year later.
In order to save their home from foreclosure, the Larsons
filed suit on May 19, 1987, to rescind the trust deed as a
consumer credit transaction under 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b), and to
enjoin the trustee's sale. Although Dale Larson denied ever
signing the trust deed, Grethe Larson admitted responsibility for
placing both his and her signatures on the deed and the lease,
but claimed she did so because of fraud and coercion. Grethe
Larson also alleged the notary Linda Milne was not present when
the documents were signed. The district court denied the
Larsons' application for a preliminary injunction and the real
property was sold to Overland for $51,864.90.
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The Larsons requested leave to file an amended complaint
and, by August 1, 1988, had filed four more amended complaints
due, in large part, to their failure adequately to plead fraud.
Counterclaims were filed and, after discovery and depositions,
Milne and Western Surety moved for summary judgement. Overland
soon followed with two separate motions for partial summary
judgment.
The district court granted the motion for summary judgment
filed by Milne and Western Surety and dismissed with prejudice
the Larsons' fraud claims against the notary and the bond
company. The court next granted Overland's motion for partial
summary judgment, and dismissed all claims asserted by Systematic
Builders. At the same time, the court dismissed the Larsons'
claims against Overland for "fraud, duress and so on"; ordered
the transfer of Grethe Larson's one-half interest in the Larsons'
home to Overland; determined that the "lease" was, as a matter of
law, a true lease and not a security agreement; ordered that Dale
Larson was fully obligated on the guaranty; entered judgment
against Dale Larson on the leas^-dUe to his status as a partner
in L & L Wire; and, denied the Larsons' claims that enforcement
of the lease allowed double recovery and penalty because Overland
only sought to recover amounts due after offset from sale
proceeds.
The district court later granted Overland's second motion
for partial summary judgment on the remaining counts: that the
sale of the equipment by Overland was made in good faith; and,
that Dale Larson was liable under the lease for $69,883.80. The
court then certified the judgments as final under Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. LMV Leasing. Inc. v. Conlin. 805
P.2d 189, 192 (Utah App. 1991). In determining whether the trial
court correctly found that there was no genuine issue of material
fact, we review the facts and inferences from them in the light
most favorable to the losing party. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt
Paving. Inc. v. Blomcruist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). We
review conclusions of law for correctness and give no deference
to the trial court. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State of
Utah, 779 P.2d 634, 636-37 (Utah 1989).
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The interpretation of a contract can present either a
question of law, to be determined by the words of the agreement,
or a question of fact, to be determined by extrinsic evidence.
Kimball v. Campbell. 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985).
Interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law
and does not require any deference to the conclusions of the
trial court. LMV Leasing, 805 P.2d at 192. If the terms of an
agreement are clear and unambiguous, we interpret them according
to their plain and ordinary meaning and extrinsic or parol
evidence is generally not admissible to explain the intent of the
parties. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah
1983); Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co.. 776
P.2d 933, 936 (Utah App. 1989).
Language is ambiguous if the words used to express the
intent of the parties are insufficient so that the contract may
be understood to reach two or more plausible meanings. Property
Assistance Corp. v. Roberts, 768 P.2d 976, 977 (Utah App. 1989).
When a contract is ambiguous because of uncertainty in the
meaning of terms, the absence of terms or other facial
deficiencies, parol evidence is admissible to explain the intent
of the parties. Faulkner, 665 P.2d at 1293. Whether an
ambiguity exists is a question of law to be decided before parol
evidence may be admitted. Jd. The language of a contract is not
necessarily ambiguous merely because a party urges a different
meaning that is more in accordance with its own interests.
Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. 790 P.2d
581, 583 (Utah App. 1990).
III.

LEGAL NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT

The Larsons cite Colonial Leasing Co. of New England v.
Larsen Bros. Const. Co., 731 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986), for the
proposition that the character of a transaction, as a lease or a
security agreement, "may be,f ambiguous when taken as a whole even
though specific terms are not.1 The supreme court identified

1. The Larsons present no argument that words are missing within
the terms themselves or that other deficiencies in the contract
would have required extrinsic or parol evidence to resolve any
uncertainty. We conclude the terms of the contract are clear and
unambiguous and may be interpreted in accordance with their plain
and ordinary meaning.
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numerous factors in Colonial Leasing that may bear upon whether a
lease or a security agreement was intended.2
In addition to the presence of several lease terms that were
identified as factors in Colonial Leasing, the Larsons note the
existence of an option to purchase the equipment, and the
treatment of their home as "additional security" as indications
that the parties intended a security agreement. In LMV Leasing.
805 P.2d at 196, this court identified ownership (or its
functional equivalent) and the means to transfer ownership (such
as a purchase option) as a key distinction between a lease and a
security agreement.
Under the express language of the lease, however, Dale
Larson and Robert Lucking acquired no ownership interest, right
or title in the equipment other than a leasehold:
9. OWNERSHIP, PERSONAL PROPERTY: Equipment is and
shall at all times remain, the property of Lessor; and
Lessee shall have no right, title or interest therein
or thereto except as expressly set forth in this
Lease[.] Equipment is, and shall at all times be and
remain, personal property notwithstanding that
2.

In Colonial Leasing, the supreme court said:
\
Numerous factors bear on determining whether the
terms of an agreement show that it was meant to be a
lease or a security agreement. Among others, those
factors are whether (1) the lessor is a financier, (2)
the lessee is required to insure the goods in favor of
the lessor, (3) the lessee bears the risk of loss or
damage, (4) the lessee is to pay the taxes, repairs,
and maintenance, (5) the agreement establishes default
provisions governing acceleration and resale, (6) a
substantial non-refundable deposit is required, (7) the
goods are to be selected from a third party by the
lessee, (8) the rental payments were equivalent to the
costs of the goods plus interest, (9) the lessor lacks
facilities to store or retake the goods, (10) the lease
may be discounted with a bank, (11) the warranties
usually found in leases are omitted, and (12) the
goods or fixtures are impractical to remove.
731 P.2d at 487 (citing J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the
Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code 882-83 (2d ed. 1980)). But
see Utah Code Ann. S 70A-1-201(37)(c)(1990)(negating impact of
Colonial Leasing factors (2), (3), and (4)).
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Equipment or any part thereof may now be, or hereafter
become, in any manner affixed or attached to real
property or any building thereon.
Dale Larson and Robert Lucking were, however, granted an option
to purchase the equipment for fair market value at the end of the
lease period:
11. OPTION TO PURCHASE: Lessee shall have an option
to purchase Equipment at the end of the lease period
for FAIR MARKET VALUE at the time plus all obligations
remaining due under this Lease. Notice of exercise of
this option must be given in writing to Lessor or
Lessor's assignee at least thirty (30) days prior to
the expiration of the Lease. This option shall
terminate and be avoid [sic] upon termination of this
lease by reason of Lessee's default.
The issue thus presented is whether an option to purchase
leased equipment for fair market value is indicative of a lease
or a security agreement. On this point, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1201(37)(1980), provides:
Whether a lease is intended as security is to be
determined by the facts of each case; however, (a) the
inclusion of an option to purchase does not itself make
the lease one intended for security, and (b) an
agreement that upon compliance with the terms of the
lease the lessee shall become or has the option to
become the owner of the property for no additional
consideration or for a nominal consideration does make
the lease one intended for security.
Under this statute, the inclusion of an option is not
necessarily determinative of the character of an agreement. The
critical factor is the economic value of the consideration to be
paid for the exercise of an option. The treatment of a lease as
a true lease or a security agreement based on the economic value
of consideration to be paid was further explained by a 1990
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amendment to section 70A-1-201(37).3
in pertinent part, as follows:

The statute now provides,

(b) Whether a transaction creates a lease or a
security interest is determined by the facts of each
case; however, a transaction creates a security
interest if the consideration the lessee is to pay the
lessor for the right to possession and use of the goods
is an obligation for the term of the lease not subject
to termination by the lessee, and:
• • • •

(iv) the lessee has an option to become the
owner of the goods for no additional or nominal
additional consideration upon compliance with the
lease agreement.

(d) For purposes of this subsection:
(i) Additional consideration is not nominal
if . . • when the option to become the owner of
the goods is granted to the lessee the price is
stated to be the fair market value of the goods
determined at the time the option is to be
performed.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(37)(1990) .
Although a lease with an option to purchase for no
additional or nominal additional consideration constitutes a
security agreement under subsection (b)(iv), a purchase option at
fair market value is not nominal under the definition of
additional consideration in (d)(i). Since the purchase option
was not nominal and the Larsons have not raised any argument with
respect to the economic life of the equipment,4 we conclude that
the lease is a true lease and not a security agreement. ~

3. Retroactive application of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1201(37)(b)(1990) to the issue before us is permissible because
the amendments merely clarify or amplify the understanding of the
former law. See Department of Social Servs. v. Hiqqs, 656 P.2d
998, 1001 (Utah 1982); QKlfrncj Qqns%, Qqf y, mistrial CQfflff'n,
520 P.2d 208 (Utah 1974).
4. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(37)(b)(i)-(iii); LMV Leasing.
805 P.2d at 196 n.6.
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Accordingly, we do not address the commercial reasonableness
of the sale because the lease is not a security agreement and a
commercially reasonable sale was not required under the lease.
In addition, we dismiss the claim that failure to dispose of the
equipment in a commercially reasonable manner allowed for double
recovery and penalty since Overland is entitled to recover
amounts due under the lease after offset from sale proceeds.5 ^jt>
IV.

FRAUD AND DURESS CLAIMS AGAINST OVERLAND

On appeal, the Larsons argue that they were induced to enter
into the lease by the fraudulent representations of Overland or
its agents and that the question of reasonable reliance raises
issues of fact that preclude summary judgment. In support of
their argument, the Larsons refer in general to the allegations
in the amended pleadings, and the affidavit of Grethe Larson.
The Larsons also cite Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins.
Co., 666 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 1983)(negligent misrepresentation);
Pace v. Parrish. 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (Utah 1952)
(fraudulent misrepresentation); and, Conder v. A.L. Williams and
Assocs. Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah App. 1986)(fraudulent
misrepresentation). However, the allegations referred to support
both a claim of fraud as well as duress, and much of the
confusion in this case stems from the parties' failure to
distinguish between the claims of fraud and duress.
Grethe Larson made several allegations in her affidavit and
the "Amended Fourth Amended Complaint" that relate to fraud.
Grethe Larson alleges that PFC employee Welling brought several
unidentified documents to her home on November 20, 1984, to close
5. The Larsons challenge the award of attorney fees by the trial
court as an additional issue on appeal. The issue was not listed
in the statement of issues presented for review in their opening
brief, but was raised for the first time in their reply brief.
Rule 24(c) of the Appellate Rules of Procedure limits answers in
a reply brief to new matter in the appellee's brief. The issue
of attorney fees was not raised as new matter, either directly or
by inference, in appellee's brief. We decline consideration of
the argument, therefore, for failure to comply with the briefing
requirement of the rules. See Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69,
72 (Utah App. 1991); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.. 746 P.2d
1182, 1184-85 (Utah App. 1987). See also Demetropolous v.
Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d
1278 (Utah 1988).

900411-CA

8

the deal on the equipment lease. Grethe Larson claims Welling
told her about a separate agreement between Intermountain and PFC
in favor of Overland to "buy back11 the equipment for $35,000 in
case of default, and that money from the sale of the equipment
would offset the Larsons' total potential liability of $75,000
under the guaranty. Grethe Larson also claimed that Welling said
if monthly payments were made and there were no default, the
guaranty would be released and the Larson home would not be
involved in the transaction for more than a year.
Grethe Larson also made allegations that related to duress.
Grethe Larson alleged that Welling insisted she sign the
documents immediately, and that he held the documents fast to the
table with only their signature blanks exposed. Grethe Larson
avers Welling told her there was no time to read the documents
and prevented her from reading them. Grethe Larson also said she
was not told that a trust deed was included among the documents
she signed. Grethe Larson said she felt rushed, but in reliance
on Welling's representations, signed both her name and her
husband's name to the documents without reading them or knowing
what they really were. After she executed the documents, Grethe
Larson claimed Welling took them with him to be notarized and
promised to return that same day with copies. However, Grethe
Larson stated she was never given any copies.
Grethe Larson was later deposed and stated, among other
things, that Welling actually had handed her the documents, and
that she not only had the opportunity, but could have read them
if she wanted. She also said Welling never told her she could
not read the documents, but that she felt he was in a hurry and,
for reasons of her own, chose not to. On the basis of these
contradictions in her statements, Overland brought a motion for
summary judgment that quoted from portions of the deposition at
length. The trial court ruled there was "no evidence" to support
the claims of "fraud, duress and so on."
In Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983), the
supreme court held that when a party takes a clear position in a
deposition that is not later modified on cross-examination, he
may not raise contradictory statements in his own affidavit as
issues of fact unless he can explain the discrepancy. Because of
the contradictory statements in her deposition that were not
later modified, we affirm the judgment of the trial court on the
issue of "duress and so on." However, since Overland's motion
for summary judgment addressed only those statements relating to
duress, we decline to affirm summary judgment on the fraud claim.
Disposition of the duress claim does not resolve the fraud claim.
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In addition, Overland proffered no evidence to counter the
Larsons' allegations of agency other than a bald assertion that
it did not exist.
Accordingly, there was no basis for the trial court to grant
summary judgment on the issue of fraud. The trial court erred,
therefore, in dismissing the fraud claim against Overland. We
reverse and remand the fraud claim for further proceedings.
V.

THE TRUST DEED AS A CONDITIONAL GUARANTY

The Larsons argue that the trust deed must be construed as a
conditional guaranty that obligates Grethe Larson to answer for
the debt of her husband and Robert Lucking, the lessees, but only
after Overland first exhausts the security and establishes a
deficiency. Failure to exhaust the security, the Larsons claim,
releases them from the guaranty and prevents foreclosure. See.
e.g., Carrier Brokers, Inc. v. Spanish Trail. 751 P.2d 258, 261
(Utah App. 1988)(a conditional guaranty is not immediately
enforceable upon default, but requires some contingency to happen
to fix liability. The creditor may be required by the terms of
the guaranty to pursue the debtor first or designated security,
or both, and failure to do so releases the guarantor.)
The Larsons' argument on conditional guaranties, however, is
not \on point. The Larson house was expressly pledged as
additional security in the equipment lease and was secured by
means of the trust deed. The house is, therefore, subject to
foreclosure independent of the guaranty. Inasmuch as Overland
could have executed against any and all security pledged,
Overland could initiate foreclosure on the house regardless of
the nature of the guaranty.
VI.

FRAUD CLAIMS AGAINST MILNE AND WESTERN SURETY

The Larsons appeal the dismissal of their claims against
Linda Milne, a notary, and Western Surety, the bond company
insuring Milne as a notary, for Milne's false notarization and
acknowledgment of the trust deed. The Larsons claim the trust
deed was not signed in Milne's presence and that proximate cause
is an issue of fact. The Larsons cite DeCamp v. Allen, 156 So.2d
661 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App. 1963), and Collins & Sons Fine Jewelry,
Inc. v. Carolina Safety Svs., Inc., 371 S.E.2d 539 (S.C.App.
1988) , for the proposition that a notary who improperly
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authenticates a document that results in detrimental reliance by
innocent third persons will be liable for fraud.
Although the facts regarding execution of the documents are
in dispute, we are required to adopt the Larsons' version for
purposes of this review. In order to prevail against summary
judgment, however, the Larsons must prove a causal connection
between the notarization and the loss of their home.
An acknowledgment or other proof of execution, such as a
notarization, is a prerequisite to recording a deed of trust or
other conveyance of real property under Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-1
(1990). Recording protects the beneficiaries of a trust deed
against subsequent buyers by imparting notice, but neither
recording nor notarization is a necessary condition to enforce a
trust deed between parties to a conveyance. Utah Code Ann. § 573-2(3) (1990); Greaerson v. Jensen. 669 P.2d 396 (Utah 1983);
Horman v. Clark, 744 P.2d 1014 (Utah App. 1987). Accordingly,
notarization did not give Overland the right to foreclose
inasmuch as Overland could have foreclosed on the home whether or
not the trust deed was recorded. The Larsons, therefore, could
not prevail on these facts because any improper notarization did
not create or alter the legal relationship between the Larsons
and Overland.
The Larsons offer absolutely no explanation as to how third
parties relied on the notarization and how the reliance caused
the Larsons to lose their home. Inasmuch as the Larsons could
hav^ lost their home without any acknowledgment and they offered
no further explanation on how the notarization caused them to
lose their home, or any other good faith argument to extend,
modify or reverse existing law, we deem the appeal on this issue
to be frivolous. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court in favor of Milne and Western Surety and grant them
single costs and reasonable attorney fees to Milne and Western
Surety pursuant to their request under Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 33.
VII.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the agreement in this case was a lease and
not a security agreement. We conclude that the claim of duress
was unsupported. We also conclude that the house was subject to
execution, regardless of the nature of the guaranty, because it
was expressly pledged as security in the lease. Although we
affirm these rulings in favor of Overland, we reverse the summary
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judgment on the claim of fraud, and remand the case to the trial
court for further proceedings on that issue.
We also affirm the judgment of the trial court on the claims
against Milne and Western Surety. We award them single costs and
reasonable attorney fees as requested under Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 33, since the Larsons' appeal against these
parties is frivolous.

Ify&ett M &-**£'
Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge

WE CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

Norman H. Jackson, Judge
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APPENDIX II

(JUDGMENT, March 1, 1990)

WW

Joseph T. Dunbeck, Jr. (3645)

Leslie J.
WATKISS &
310 South
Salt Lake
Telephone

'1 ""•'">

Randolph (5009)
SAPERSTEIN
Main, Suite 1200
City, Utah 84101
(801) 363-3300

Attorneys for Defendants Linda D. Milne and Western Surety Company

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DALE L. LARSON, GRETHE LARSON,
and SYSTEMATIC BUILDERS, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
OVERLAND THRIFT AND LOAN, a
Utah Corporation, B. RAY Z0LL,
Trustee, LINDA D. MILNE, and
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY,
Defendants.

:
:
:

ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

:

Civil No. C 87-3405

:
:
:
:

Judge Scott Daniels

:

This matter came before the Court upon the Motion for Summar
Judgment of Defendants Linda D. Milne and Western Surety Comp.:
and Defendants' Notice of Request to Submit Motion for Summary
Judgment for Decision, the Court having reviewed the file and
pleadings and memoranda herein and for good cause appearing
therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summnrv
JuriqiTifint- is granted,

and

Plaintiffs' Complaint,

as

final

amended, and claims against Defendants Linda D. Milne and westei

Surety Company are dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits.
DATED this

1

day of

1990.

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS
District Court Judge
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APPENDIX III

(JUDGMENT, March 27, 1990)

Jeffrey M. Jones, Esq. (1741)
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. (4025)
Robert L. Payne, Esq. (5129)
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS
215 South State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 531-8400
Attorneys for Defendant Overland
Thrift & Loan
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DALE L. LARSON and GRETHE LARSON,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
vs.

;

OVERLAND THRIFT & LOAN, a Utah
corporation, LINDA D. MILNE
and WESTERN SURETY COMPANY,

]

Defendants.

Civil NO. C87-3405
Judge Scott Daniels

i

The Motion of Defendant Overland Thrift & Loan ("Overland")
for Partial Summary Judgment in the above-entitled matter came on
for hearing before the Honorable Scott Daniels on March 8, 1990,
at the hour of 9:00 a.m. Plaintiffs appeared by and through their
counsel, Joseph Bottum, and Overland appeared by and through its
counsel, Robert L. Payne of ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS. The Court,
having

fully

Judgment,

reviewed

Overland1s

the memoranda

submitted

Motion
in

for

support

Partial
and

Summary

opposition

thereto, all other pleadings of record previously filed with the

Court, and having further heard oral arguments of counsel, and
being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing
therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiff Systematic Builders, Inc., and all
claims allegedly

asserted by it are hereby dismissed without

prejudice from this action; it is further
ORDERED that Overland1s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
with regard to all issues, claims, and causes of action for fraud
and duress asserted by plaintiffs against Overland in connection
with the execution of all documents is hereby granted; it is
further
ORDERED that Overland!s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on the issue of transfer and the effect of transfer of the joint
tenancy interest of Grethe Larson in and to the Larson residence
located

at 4845 South 3600 West, Salt Lake City, Utah

(the

"Residence") is hereby granted, the Court having determined that
the execution of a Deed of Trust by Grethe Larson describing the
Residence was valid, binding, and enforceable as a matter of law,
and that it further created a severance of the joint tenancy of
Dale L. Larson and Grethe Larson in the Residence.

Pursuant to

such transfer of interest by Grethe Larson and the subsequent
foreclosure of the Deed of Trust by Overland, the Court orders that
the present interests of Overland and Dale L. Larson in and to the
Residence are that of tenants in common, each owning an individual
one-half (1/2) interest therein; it is further

RLP-hh
\RLP\2362
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ORDERED that as a matter of law, the Lease Agreement between
Robert J. Lucking and Dale L. Larson dba L & L Wire EDM and PFC
dated November 27, 1984 (the "Lease") , is a true lease and not a
security agreement subject to the provisions of Article 9 of the
Utah Commercial Code; it is further
ORDERED that Overland!s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on the issue of the liability of Dale L. Larson under the terms of
the Equipment Lease Guaranty is hereby granted, the Court having
determined that no question of fact exists with respect to the
execution thereof, and that Dale L. Larson is and shall be fully
obligated and liable under the terms of the Equipment Lease
Guaranty; it is further
ORDERED that Overland!s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on the issue of liability of Dale L. Larson under the Lease is
hereby granted, the Court having found no genuine issue of material
fact to exist regarding Mr. Larson's execution of the Certificate
of Partnership, and having further determined that Mr. Larson is
estopped from claiming he was not a partner in L & L Wire EDM, the
lessee under the terms of the Lease.

Inasmuch as the Lease

constitutes a valid partnership debt, Dale L. Larson is and shall
be liable for all amounts shown to be due thereunder; it is further
ORDERED that Overlandfs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
against plaintiffs concerning plaintiffs1 allegations that the
Lease

imposed

a penalty

or allowed

double

recovery

against

plaintiffs is hereby granted, the Court having determined that

HLPhn
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Overland seeks only amounts due after offset of equipment sale
proceeds; it is further
ORDERED

that

Overlandfs

Motion

to

Compel

responses

to

discovery is hereby granted, and that plaintiffs shall serve upon
Overland or its counsel ten (10) days from the date of hearing full
and adequate responses to Overlandfs Third Set of Interrogatories
and Requests for Production of Documents,
The Court having fully reviewed issues in dispute and having
granted partial summary judgment as aforementioned, it is hereby
ORDERED that the remaining issues for trial upon the merits
are (1) whether the equipment subject to the Lease was sold or
otherwise disposed of in good faith by Overland and/or its agents;
(2) the amount of liability accruing to Dale L. Larson under the
terms of the Equipment Lease Guaranty and the Lease; and (3) the
authority of Grethe Larson to execute the Deed of Trust for and on
behalf of Dale L. Larson.
DATED this

day of March, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

The Honorable Scott Daniels
Third District Court Judge

Approved as to form:

Joseph H. Bottum, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
RLPhh
\RLP\2362
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APPENDIX IV

(JUDGMENT, May 14, 1990)

Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. (4025)
Robert L. Payne, Esq, (5129)
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS
Attorneys for Defendant
Overland Thrift & Loan
215 South State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-8400

Pitf 1 k 1H90

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

DALE L. LARSON, GRETHE
LARSON, and SYSTEMATIC
BUILDERS, INC., a Utah
corporation,

5-t%^ o-&a5cuwv

Plaintiffs,
vs.
OVERLAND THRIFT AND LOAN,
a Utah corporation, LINDA
D. MILNE and WESTERN SURETY
COMPANY,

Civil No. C87-3405

Defendants,

Judge Scott Daniels

On or about February 13, 1990, Defendant Overland
Thrift & Loan

("Overland") filed its Motion for Summary

Judgment in the above-entitled matter. After to oral argument
on March 8, 1990, and in its Order and Judgment dated March
27, 1990, the Court granted Overland partial summary judgment
and

reserved

for

later

adjudication

three

issues

as

follows:
(1)

Whether the equipment subject to the

lease was sold or otherwise disposed in good faith by
Overland and/or its agents;

(2)

The amount of liability accruing to Dale

L. Larson under the terms of* the Equipment Lease Guaranty
and the Lease; and
(3)

The authority of Grethe Larson to execute

the Deed of Trust for and on behalf of Dale L. Larson,
On or about April 10, 1990, Overland filed a Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment on the question of the amount of
damages and good faith disposition of the leased equipment.
The Court, having reviewed

Defendant's Motion

for

Partial Summary Judgment on such issues, the memorandum filed
in support thereof, and having reviewed all other pleadings
of record

previously

filed with

the Court,

and good

cause

appearing therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED, that Overland 1 s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on the issues of damages and good faith disposition
of the leased equipment is hereby granted; and it is further
ORDERED, that there is no genuine issues of material
fact

with

respect

to Overland's

disposition

of

the

leased

equipment and that the evidence before the Court satisfies the
standards of good faith disposition as a matter of law; and
it is further
ORDERED, that the liability of Dale L. Larson under
the terms of the Lease and Equipment Lease Guaranty is hereby
declared to be the amount of Sixty-Nine Thousand Eight Hundred
Eighty-Three
interest

Dollars

accruing

and

thereon

Eighty

Cents

at the

rate of eighteen

2

($69,883.80),

plus

percent

(18%) per annum from and after September 27, 1989, together
with attorney's fees, costs of collection, and costs of court
in the amount of Thirty-One Thousand Seven Hundred Forty
Dollars and Sixty-Five Cents ($31,740.65); and it is further
ORDERED, that

judgment

be entered

in

favor of

Overland against Dale L. Larson in the amount of Sixty-Nine
Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty-Three Dollars and Eighty Cents
($69,883.80), plus interest accruing thereon at the rate of
eighteen percent (18%) per annum from and after September 27,
1989, together with attorney's fees, costs of collection, and
costs of court in the amount of Thirty-One Thousand Seven
Hundred Forty Dollars and Sixty-Five Cents ($31,740.65); and
it is further
ORDERED, that such judgment amount may be augmented
in the amount of reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended
in collecting said judgment as may later be established by
affidavit.
DATED this 'n*

day of May, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Scott Daniels
District Court Judge
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APPENDIX V

(Rule 33, URAP)

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 33

Rule 32. Interest on judgment.
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money in a civil case is
affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law shall be payable from the date
the judgment was entered in the trial court.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 5 Am Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error § 941.
C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1979.
A.L.R. — Date from which interest on judgment starts running, as affected by modification of amount of judgment on appeal, 4
A.L.R.3d 1221.
Right to interest pending appeal, 15
A.L.R.3d 411.

Running of interest on judgment where both
parties appeal, 11 A.L.R.4th 1099.
Retrospective application and effect of state
statute or rule allowing interest or changing
rate of interest on judgments or verdicts, 41
A.L.R.4th 694.
Key Numbers. — Interest «=> 39(2).

Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery
of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34,
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion,
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other
paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of
oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the
court shall grant a hearing.
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APPENDIX VI

(Rule 5 6 , URCP)

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine isbue as to the amount of damages.
id) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
ahall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits t«> be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party mav not rp*t upon tho
mcro alietiudouN or dtmiuiN of IIIH pit'udmg, hut IIIH response, by aHMiavHs or

as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.

APPENDIX VII

(§ 5 7 - 1 - 3 2 )

Utah Code Anno: § 57-1-32, Sale of trust property by trustee Action to recover balance due upon obligation for which trust
deed was given as security - Collection of costs and attorney's
fees.
At any time within three months after any sale of
property under a trust deed, as hereinabove provided, an action may be commenced to recover the balance due upon the obligation for which the trust
deed was given as security, and in such action the
complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the
indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed,
the amount for which such property was sold, and
the fair market value thereof at the date of sale.
Before rendering judgment, the r?onrt phfll 1 ff** +h*
fair market value at the date of sale of the property sold. The court may not render judgment
for
more than the amount by which the amount of indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of sale,
including trusteed and attorney's fees, exceeds
the fair market value of the property as of the
date of sale. In any action
brought under
this
section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to
collect
its costs and reasonable attorney fees
incurred in bringing an action under this section.

APPENDIX VIII

(Fifth Amendment)

Amend. V

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

APPENDIX IX

(Equipment Lease)

i C A t t NO"

X1

291 West 5400 South
Suite 0200
Murray, Utah 64107
601/263-2626

KJ

C, "Loaaor", hereby leases to "Laaaoa", the property describedherein below according to the terms set forth
1. DESCRIPTION OF LEASED PROPERTY:
EQUIPMENT f MANUFACTURE*. MODEL NO , TYPE. ETC.)

JANTITV

Sodick MDdel CNC1W Electrical Discharge Machine
•Including as additional security The Real Estate owned by Dale L. and
Grethe Larson as evidenced by a deed of trust dated the A7^ &&? of
November 1984, with this lease referred to therein as the underlying
indebtedness pursuant to Utah code annotated 357-1-31 (as amended).

initial

IPMENT WILL BE LOCATED AT STREET ADDRESS.
-STATE

Kearns

I t t N D E D USE

INITIAL

&£

Business,

4845 South 3600 West
UtaE
ZIP.

Initial

84118

COUNTY.

Salt Lake

Personal, Family or Household

I have read and agree unconditionally with paragraph 24 on the reverse side hereof which states that any controversy or
claim arising out of this contract shall be settled by ARBITRATION in Salt Lake City, Utah, and judgment upon the
award rendered may be entered in the courts of the State of Utah; and I hereby agree to submit to arbitration a* the
jurisdiction for purposes of enforcement of this agreement* a n d a g r e e t o p e r m i t t h e p r o v i s i o n s y O E T i t

PAYMENT A N D LEASE TERM.
>n of Lease

d.o/

60

57 of Utah Code Amotated relating to trust deed forclosures to iranBin,
in full force & effe9t separate and apart from this provision.-yx /J/

2 7 t h . day of each 82 month Q quarter Oother

Security Deposit Refundable at maturity

$

Payment amount each period

$

O»T.X

fAcas of P F CtoSalt Lake City
us beginning

1 1 - 2 7.

lyment due

12-27,,

.19- JLA.
. t0.

-ait.

i f ^

$.

1

* * ^ .

m-s?

2,108,97
4,217,94

Total Payment including Use Tax ,
Total FRONT PAYMENT Including Security

• trWESTMGMT TAX CRCDIT, tf 4/VV, SHALL DC CLAfMED BY LESSOR
ASSIGNMENT OF WARRANTIES AND LIMIT ON LESSOR'S LIABILITY- Neither Lessor nor any assignee of Lessor shall be liable for any failure to
any provision hereof resulting from fire or other casualty, not, strike oi other labor difficulty, governmental regulation or restriction or any cause be
Mor'i control. In no event shall Lessor be liable for any lots of profits or other consequential damage or any inconvenience resulting from any theft,
to, loss of, defect in or failure of the equipment, or the time consumed in recovering, repairing, adjusting, servicing or replacing the same, and there shall
tatement or apportionment of rental during such time LESSOR MAKES NO WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, CONCERNING THE EQUIP*
HOWEVER, THIS DOES NOT ABROGATE ANY WARRANTY PROVIDED BY THE MANUFACTURER, WHICH WARRANTIES ARE HEREBY
ED TO LESSEE TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY CONTRACT AND LAW.
INSURANCE: Lessee, at its sole cost and expense, shall maintain in full force on all such equipment during the term of this Agreement
) A policy of public liability and property damage insurance protecting the interest of Lessor and Lessee with respect to their liability for injuries to third
ind damage to and loss of use of property of third persons resulting from the operation of the equipment leased hereunder Such public liability and
damage insurance shall have limits of not less than $100,000 per person and $300,000 for all persons injured or killed in the same accident, and shall
a limit of not less than $50,000 for damage, destruction and loss of use of property of third persons as a result of any one accident unless otherwise here

) A policy of hazard insurance including fire, theft or damage from all other insurable sources on said equipment the deductible amount to be not in
$250 Lessee shall stand the expense of said deductible amount The hazard insurance on such equipment shall be for the actual cash value of the equipI in such amounts as the Lessor shall deem adequate
RTIES HAVE READ THE ABOVE PROVISIONS AND ALSO PARAGRAPHS 4 THROUGH 24 ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF AND AGREE
)UND BY ALL SUCH PROVISIONS.
WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this instrument on the date below listed

Kent Knowle

^

972-5774

PPLIER O F E Q U I P M E N T (COMPLCTK AOORESS)

RMOUNTrMN MACHINE TOOL
Pioneer Road
Lake City, Utah 84104
(INCLUDE ZIP CODE)

„
I

Bob Lucking

.Ph.

969-7864

F U L L L E G A L N A M E A N D A D D R E S S O F LESSEE

I

Robert J. Lucking & Dale L. Larson dba L & L Wire
PO Box 168 .
EDM
West Jordon, Utah 84084
(INCLUDE ZIP CODE)
LESSEE(S)

(Sign Below)

DATE E X ^ U T E D BY LESSEE November

27,

84

